Economic Experimental Results on Multilateral Bargaining
Glenn Harrison, Gordon C. Rausser, Leo K. Simon
January 1992 [90-GATT 25]
In a companion series of papers, we have described a new bargaining institution and the design of laboratory experiments to assess its performance (see Rausser and Simon  and Harrison and Simon ). In this paper we describe and evaluate the first series of pilot experiments. In section 2 we briefly describe the general Multilateral Bargaining institution once again, so as to make the present discussion self-contained. In Section 3 we run through in some detail the numerical solution to one parameterized version of that model, to familiarize the reader with the structure and workings of the model. In Section 4 we discuss some of the conceptual issues that arise in evaluating the performance of the institution in our experiments. In Section 5 we evaluate the pilot experiments using the procedures developed. Finally, in Section 6 we outline the implications of our results for the next stage of experimentation.
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