Endogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Firm
Brent Hueth, GianCarlo Moschini
May 2014 [14-WP 547]
Hueth, B. and G. Moschini. 2014. "Endogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Firm." Working paper 14-WP 547. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University.
When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage.
Keywords: cooperatives, endogenous entry, entry deterrence, nonconvexity.
JEL codes: L22, P13