# Are we where we want to be with commodity programs?

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### Talk overview

- Where we are
- How we got here
- What are we trying to accomplish?
- What do (domestic) critics say?
- Are there alternatives?



## Are Farm Programs Counter-Productive?

- One justification for farm programs is that U.S. farmers need support because of their exposure to a great amount of risk.
- But won't a reduction in risk also reduce expected returns?
- Perhaps, but farm programs also increased expected or average returns.



### Structure of Program Payments for Corn



#### **2004 Acres Insured in Iowa**



#### **Insurance Coverage by Iowa Farmers in 2004**



#### Distribution of Farm (not field) Yields for an Average Boone County Farmer





#### **Distribution of Corn Harvest Revenue Less \$180 Variable Cost**

\$/acre

### 0.12 0.10 0.08 probability 0.06 0.04 0.02

#### **Distribution of Net Revenue Plus Direct Payments**

\$/acre

#### **Distribution of Net Revenue Plus LDPs**



#### **Distribution of Net Revenue Plus CCPs**



#### Distribution with DP, LDP, CCP



#### **Risk Free Farming?**



## **Reduced Risk**

- With no insurance or government programs:
  - Average return over variable cost = \$143/ac
  - 3.8% probability of not covering \$180 variable cost

With all government programs and insurance:

 Average returns over variable cost = \$235/ac
 5.6% probability that returns are less than \$143/ac



# Risk and Return in a Free-Market Economy

 Capitalism works when those with capital are induced to invest by the expectation of a higher return on invested capital than on non-invested capital.



## **Risk-Return Tradeoff**

Risk



## Effects of Government Programs on Iowa Cash Renters

- Cash rents will increase due to the increase in expected returns.
- Cash rent is also a variable cost of production.
- How much will cash rents increase?
   Depends on returns to corn land.



#### Effect of Government Programs on Net Returns from Iowa Soybean Producer Who Cash Rents Land



#### A Comparison of Risk and Returns for Cash Renter



- Macro-economic stabilization policy objective in the 1930s led to farm programs
  - Focus on higher prices through price supports and acreage reduction



### Relative Importance of Farming to U.S. Society and Economy



- Policy quite stable from the 1950s through the mid-1980s
  - High support prices offset by acreage restrictions
  - Corn favored over soybeans
  - High prices in 1970s and high support prices in early 1980s led to conversion of pasture to corn
- 1985 farm bill cut loan rates and took land out of production with CRP

- Freedom to farm in 1995 eliminated non-CRP acreage controls, converted deficiency payments to fixed payments, and allowed loan deficiency payments
- Price declines in late 1990s allowed gave Congress the opportunity to double AMTA payments



- "Surpluses as far as the eye can see" allowed Ag to increase baseline funding by \$78 billion and add countercyclical payments
- Surpluses also funded Agricultural Risk Protection Act which greatly expanded the crop insurance program



### What are we trying to accomplish?

- Support individual farmer income?
  - No. (No means test.)
- Enhance adoption of conservation practices?
  - No. (CSP funds are first to go. EQIP funding expanded primarily to help livestock producers meet Clean Water Act requirements
- Support crop sector income?
  - Yes. (In so doing help support national net farm income.)



#### What's Been Criticized in the Current Farm Bill?

- Payments based on price rather than revenue
  - No payments in low yield high price yields
  - "Over" payment in low price high yield years
- Why is there a need for ad hoc disaster payments?
- Why are we making payments to cotton farmers who have not grown cotton in 8 years?
- Have we lost the "high road" now that the EU has reformed its policies?
- How should we respond to the WTO cotton case?
- Why do we have two agencies of USDA providing income support? (FSA, RMA)
- Overall cost

# An Alternative

- Make payments when county average yield times harvest price is less than target revenue
- Much like GRIP replacing CBOT price with a target price
  - Would do away with need for disaster assistance
  - Would replace much of the risk borne by the crop insurance program

### Calculating the target

- Expected production times national loan rate plus
- Maximum CCP rate times CCP base production *plus*
- Direct payment rate times base





#### Market and Target Revenue for Corn and Soybeans Since 2002

#### FIGURE 1. DO FARM BILL PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?





#### FIGURE 3. WOULD MODIFIED GRIP PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?



