

# Willingness to Pay Under Uncertainty: Beyond Graham's Willingness to Pay Locus

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# Purpose: Unify and extend concepts of welfare measurement under uncertainty

## ◆ **Option Price** (Ex Ante Compensating Variation)

- Weisbrod, Schmalensee, Bishop, Cichetti and Freeman  
Helms, Smith, Ready
- *Ex ante* Payments

## ◆ **Graham's WTP Locus** (1981)

- *Ex ante* commitments to *ex post* payments

## ◆ **Dynamic WTP**

- Zhao and Kling
- *Ex ante* payments incorporating value of learning and delay opportunities

## ◆ **Quasi Option Value**

- Arrow and Fisher, Henry, Fisher and Hanemann
- *Ex ante* adjustment to decision rule

# Basics

Notation:

$x$  = public good: two levels  $x_1$  high,  $x_0$  low,

$\theta$  = value of the public good,  $\theta^H$  or  $\theta^L$  with probability  $\pi$  and  $(1 - \pi)$ ,

$y$  = income,

2 periods, uncertainty resolved in first period

State Independent Payment (*Ex Ante* Payment)

How much is a consumer willing to pay **today** to obtain a higher level of public good provision?

*State Dependent Payments (Ex Ante Commitment to Ex Post Payments)*

What state dependent combination of payments is a consumer willing to commit to **today** to obtain a higher level of public good provision?

# Option Price and Graham's Locus

- ◆ State Independent Payment: What is most the consumer will pay for  $x_1$  to hold her expected utility the same as  $x_0$ ?

$$\begin{aligned} & \{(1-\pi)U(x_1, \theta^L, y-OP) + \pi U(x_1, \theta^H, y-OP)\}(1+\beta) \\ & = \{\pi U(x_0, \theta^H, y) + (1-\pi)U(x_0, \theta^L, y)\}(1+\beta) \end{aligned}$$

- ◆ State Dependent Payments

$$(1-\pi)U(x_1, \theta^L, y-c^L) + \pi U(x_1, \theta^H, y-c^H) = \pi U(x_0, \theta^H, y) + (1-\pi)U(x_0, \theta^L, y)$$

# Uncertainty and Learning: Dynamic WTP

- ◆ Introduce opportunities for learning and delay into formation of WTP and WTA
- ◆ National Park can be improved now or can delay, study habitat recovery, and decide later
- ◆ State Independent Payment: What is most the consumer will pay for  $x_1$  to hold her expected utility equal to going without today?

# Uncertainty and Learning: Dynamic WTP

## ◆ Expected utility if purchase today

- Period 1:  $(1-\pi)U(x_1, \theta^L, y-k) + \pi U(x_1, \theta^H, y-k)$
- Period 2:  $\beta[(1-\pi)U(x_1, \theta^L, y-k) + \pi U(x_1, \theta^H, y-k)]$

## ◆ Expected utility if do not purchase today

- Period 1:  $\pi U(x_0, \theta^H, y) + (1-\pi)U(x_0, \theta^L, y)$
- Period 2:  $\beta\{\pi U(x_1, \theta^H, y-k) + (1-\pi)U(x_0, \theta^L, y)\}$

## ◆ Equate these expected values, solve for k

- ◆  $k$  = Dynamic WTP: the most a consumer would be WTP today when learning and delay is possible

# Relationship between Dynamic WTP and Option Price

◆ Dynamic WTP ● OP

◆ Dynamic WTP = k = OP - CC

◆ CC = Commitment cost  
=  $r \text{ QOV} / E_{\square} \text{ Mu}_y$   
= Annualized, monetized QOV

# Dynamic WTP Locus


## ◆ Allowing State Dependent Payments

$$\begin{aligned} & (1-\pi)[U(x_1, \theta^L, y-k_L) + \beta U(x_1, \theta^L, y-k_L)] \\ & \quad + \pi[U(x_1, \theta^H, y-k_H) + \beta U(x_1, \theta^H, y-k_H)] \\ = & \pi U(x_0, \theta^H, y) + (1-\pi)U(x_0, \theta^L, y) \\ & \quad + \beta\{\pi \text{Max}[U(x_1, \theta^H, y-k_H), U(x_0, \theta^H, y)] \\ & \quad + (1-\pi)\text{Max}[U(x_1, \theta^L, y-k_{L2}), U(x_0, \theta^L, y)]\} \end{aligned}$$


## ◆ Compensation bundles could also be time dependent



# Dynamic WTP Locus



# Dynamic WTA and WTP Locus



# Implications for Environmental Economics

- ◆ From QOV literature: when learning and delay possible, efficient to incorporate this information into decision making.
  - ◆ But, the WTP (e.g. from SP survey) may already include adjustments for information, if so, adjusting decision rule to incorporate QOV will be incorrect – double counting
  - ◆ If SP respondents are thinking dynamically, do the delay and learning opportunities they **perceive** match reality?
  - ◆ SP survey design may need to explicitly communicate delay and learning opportunities.

## Implications (continued)

- ◆ From Graham, with heterogeneous individuals (risk) a project can pass a potential pareto test using an aggregate loci when it would fail a state independent test
  - ◆ Risk sharing creates an additional benefit
  - ◆ Similar benefits with Dynamic WTP loci, but also with regard to differences in time preferences and learning opportunities
  - ◆ Use of compensation schemes along the WTP loci can allow efficient distribution of commitment cost

# Illustration: CES Utility

## ◆ Utility function

$$U = \frac{\theta x^\rho}{\rho} + (1 - \theta) \frac{y^\rho}{\rho}$$

## ◆ Parameter values (Corrigan, 2002)


$$\theta^H = 0.03, \theta^L = 0.01, \rho = 0.277$$

$$y = 50,000, x^1 = 1, x^0 = 0$$


$$\beta = \frac{1}{1+r} = .952 \quad (r = 0.05)$$

$$\pi = 0.5$$


# Dynamic WTP, Option Price and Uncertainty



# Dynamic WTP, Option Price and the Probability of High



# Dynamic WTP and WTA





# Dynamic WTP Locus

